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ARGUMENT
I.
THERE WAS PROCEDURAL ERROR IN THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN THIS
CASE AND THE FACTS OF THOSE CASE UPON WHICH RESPONDENT
RELIES ARE CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE
After the parties agreed on a set of stipulated facts
including documentary evidence (R. 175-232)/ and submitted
written arguments/ Judge Philip Fishier entered a minute order
(R. 266) stating simply that judgment should be granted for
plaintiff Dover Elevator.

Shortly thereafter/ Judge Fishier

resigned and was replaced on the bench by Judge Michael Murphy.
The record contains no indication that Judge Murphy reconsidered
the stipulated facts or written argument.
ically

Judge Murphy specif-

declined to enter conclusions of law based on the stipu-

lated facts.

He did/ however/ enter a judgment (R. 402) for

plaintiff.
In its Opening Brief/ appellant Garden Towers CondoOwners Corporation argued that it was reversable error for Judge
Murphy to enter judgment without reaching conclusions of law and
without having reexamined the stipulated facts and legal arguments of counsel.

Appellant had a fundamental right to a full

hearing and an informed decision.

Judge Murphy's entry of

judgment/ based solely on Judge Fishler's minute order/ without
first becoming familiar with the facts and law, denied appellant
that right.
In response. Respondent has cited Matter of Estate of
Cassity/ 656 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1982), and State v. Kelsey, 532 P.2d
1001 (Utah 1975)/ as cases where this court approved the entry of

1

judgment by a successor judge after the "judge before whom [the]
action [was] tried [was] unable to perform the duties to be
performed by the court".

Rule 63/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Appellant has no disagreement with the holdings of
those two cases but they are clearly distinguishable.

In fact/

the procedure followed by the successor trial court judge in
Matter of Estate of Cassity was essentially what appellant
submits Judge Murphy should have/ but did not/ follow in the
instant case.
Snow.

In Cassity/ trial was held before District Judge

After hearing all of the evidence and arguments Judge Snow

ordered his clerk to make a minute entry upholding the validity
of a contested will.

Judge Snow then died before signing

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Judge David B. Dee,

His successor/ District

entered Findings and Conclusions but only

after reviewing the transcript of the prior trial along with all
of the depositions/ pleadings and exhibits/ supplemented by oral
arguments of counsel.

656 P.2d at 1024.

On appeal/ the Supreme

Court pointed out that/
"The conflict in this case comes not from the evidence
but from the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence as to
the existence of any undue influence. In view of these
circumstances/ we find no abuse of discretion on the part of
Judge Dee in failing to have the witnesses re-testify in
front of him. . . . The trial here was complete to the point
of all the evidence being in and the original judge having
made a decision. The task confronting Judge Dee was
confined to determining what conclusions were to be drawn
from the testimony which had been given." 656 P.2d at 1025.
(emphasis added)
Likewise/ in the instant case when Judge Fishier
resigned and the case was assigned to Judge Murphy/ Judge Murphy
knew what Judge Fishler's decision was.
2

He was not/ however/

given any clue as to Judge Fishler's conclusions of law that led
to the ultimate conclusion that judgment should be granted for
plaintiff.

In this case/ there is no evidence in the record that

Judge Murphy reconsidered the Stipulated Facts or arguments of
counsel and the inference is strong that he did not.

Instead/

Judge Murphy entered judgment based solely on Judge Fishler's
minute entry stating/ "The court having heretofore taken this
matter under advisement/ comes now the court & orders that
judgment be granted to plaintiff."

All that Garden Towers asked

was that Judge Murphy reexamine the stipulated facts and legal
arguments and reach his own conclusions of law before entering
judgment/ but he did not do so.
The facts of State v. Kelsey/ supra/ 532 P.2d 1001/ are
also clearly distinguishable.

In that case Judge Wilkins/ who

presided at trial/ resigned before written findings of fact and
conclusions of law were made and placed in the file.

But before

resigning/ Judge Wilkins stated into the record findings and a
verdict which "were sufficient to meet the requirments of Rule
52, U.R.C.P."

532 P.2d at 1006.

That being the case, the

Supreme Court held that "there can be no question about the
authority or propriety of the successor judge to make and sign
formal findings of fact and conclusions of law which were
consistent with the findings and verdict of the judge who
actually tried the case."

Id.

In the instant case/ Judge

1. Based on Judge Murphy's refusal to sfgn Conclusions of Law
submitted by counsel for Dover Elevator.

3

Fishier did not reach conclusions of law sufficient to meet the
requirements of Rule 52.

He resigned leaving only the minute

order so frequently quoted in the briefs—a minute order that
gave appellant and Judge Murphy no clue as to why judgment should
be entered for plaintiff.
In its brief/ counsel for Dover Elevator points out
that he submitted Conclusions of Law to Judge Murphy for entry,
but counsel for appellant objected to entry of those Conclusions
of Law.

Respondent correctly states that "These formal Con-

clusions were not entered because Defendant-Appellant argued to
Judge Murphy that it was improper for him to do so."
ent's Brief/ page 11.

Respond-

Respondent concludes that a party may not

complain on appeal of error that he caused or requested at the
trial level.

Id.

It was not the entry of Conclusions of Law by

Judge Murphy, per se,

that appellant objected to.

Rather/ it was

entry of Conclusions of Law submitted by respondent when Judge
Murphy had declined to in effect hold a new trial by reviewing
the Stipulated Facts and legal arguments of counsel.

To sign the

Conclusions of Law submitted by counsel for respondent would have
required Judge Murphy to adopt those Conclusions as his own and
he was not familiar with the case.
to be the case.

Judge Murphy recognized that

What he apparantly overlooked was that entry of

a judgment without first entering conclusions of law denied
appellant its right to know that the issues were dealty with
fully and properly.
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II.
THE STIPULATED FACTS PROVIDE NO BASIS FOR CONCLUDING THAT
HILL-MANGUM ENTERED INTO ANY CONTRACT IN ITS CAPACITY AS
BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NOR THAT IT CONFORMED WITH REQUIRMENTS
OF THE DECLARATION AND BY-LAWS WHEN IT CONTRACTED WITH
DOVER ELEVATOR
The entirety of Point II of Dover Elevator's argument
is devoted to a point with which there is no disagreement:

Until

an association of unit owners is organized, the developer of a
condominium building or complex may act as the Board of Directors
of the not yet organized association of unit owners.
In its Opening Brief, appellant set forth its argument
that while Hill-Mangum had the right pursuant to the Utah
Condominium Act and the Garden Towers Declaration of Condominium
to act as the Board of Directors of the owners association which
was not yet formed, neither the elevator maintenance agreement
between Hill-Mangum and Dover Elevator nor the Stipulated Facts
contain any indication that Hill-Mangum entered into the
2
agreement in any representative capacity.

Stipulated Fact 6,

upon which respondent relies in asserting that "Hill-Mangum, as
the Board of Directors, contracted with Dover Elevator"
(Respondent's Brief, page 15), does not justify that conclusion.
To the contrary, Stipulated Fact 6 leads only to the conclusion
that Hill-Mangum employee Gary Lawrence, as agent for
Hill-Mangum, entered into a contract with Dover.
2. "6. On March 1, 1982, a further agreement dealing with
maintenance of the elevator to be installed was executed and also
subscribed by Gary Lawrence on behalf of Hill-Mangum, Inc. . . ."
(R. 176-177)
~
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In Respondent's Brief/ Dover Elevator conveniently side
steps appellant's entire argument with respect to the issue of
representative capacity by repeated reliance on the single
proposition that the developer may act as the Board of Directors
of the association of unit owners until the association is
organized.

The jump from that proposition to the conclusion that

in the instant case Hill-Mangum was acting in its representative
3
capacity is without support in the record.
Finally/ Dover Elevator has completely failed to
respond to appellant's argument at part IV.B. of its Opening
Brief/ beginning at page 23/ that even assuming an unexpressed
intent on the part of Hill-Mangum to contract in the capacity of
the then nonexistent owners' association's board of directors/
Hill-Mangum failed to act in conformity with requirements of the
Condominium Declaration and Bylaws prerequisite to contracting on
behalf of the owners' association.

There is no evidence that

unit owner approval of the Maintenance Agreement was obtained/ as
required by paragraphs 11(a)(3) and 14 of the Declaration.

There

3. In Point II of its argument/ Dover Elevator also asserts as
fact several things not supported by the Stipulated Facts and not
otherwise supported by the record. Dover states that its
"services were rendered to the common areas of the condominium
complex" and "[t]he unit owners jointly used the elevators and
jointly benefitted from the services rendered". Respondent's
Brief/ p. 15. For all that appears from the record/ during the
pendancy of the maintenance agreement the elevators were not used
by anyone except Hill-Mangum or for any purpose not related to
unit sales efforts. Nor is there any support in the record for
Dover's assertion that the unit owners formed a corporation in "a
thinly-veiled attempt to avoid . . . obligations to numerous
vendors." Respondent's Brief/ p. 17.
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is no evidence of a Board resolution authorizing Hill-Mangum1s
project manager/ Mike Lawrence/ to enter a contract on behalf of
the yet-to-be-formed owners1 association.

In Respondent's Brief/

Dover Elevator has not argued otherwise.
CONCLUSION
Based on all of the above/ and on the arguments set
forth in the Opening Brief of Appellant/ appellant Garden Towers
Condo-Owners Corporation respectfully submits that the judgment
entered by the trial court should be reversed and judgment
entered in favor of appellant and against plaintiff Dover
Elevator.
Alternatively/ the judgment should be reversed and the
case remanded to Judge Murphy with directions to hold/ in
essence/ a new trial.

Judge Murphy should be directed to

consider the stipulated facts and the law and only then enter
Conclusions of Law based on the stipulated facts.

If the parties

or the trial court believe further factual determinations are
necessary/ an evidentiary hearing can be held to resolve factual
issues not covered in the stipulated facts.
Appellant should be awarded its costs on appeal.
Dated this 2M^

day of September, 1987.
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

By /fW^l
Steven H. fcvbbert
Bruce E. Coke
Attorneys for Appellant
Garden Towers CondoOwners Corporation
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